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1Semantics, the study o-f meaning, has long been of
interest to philosophers and linguists. Psychology has
also examined meaning,
-focusing on issues such as
context-dependency, class/category inclusion,
similarity, typicality, and verification/contradiction.
The plethora o-f reaction time studies (the most common
method used) has yielded a wealth of data, and semantic
theories have been developed to describe and explain
these data (e.g., Collins & Qu i 1 1 i an , 1969,
h i erarch i cal -network model; Meyer, 1970,
predicate-intersections model ; Smith, Shoben, & Rips,
1974, feature-comparison model; Glass & Holyoak, 1975,
marker-searcher model).
Throughout this research, with its emphasis on
features, context, and knowledge of the world, there
seems to have been a tacit understanding that, for any
given word, meaning is static and fixed. This
assumption underlies current network and hierarchy
models. However, there have been a few attempts, by
psychologists working with polysemy (e.g., Anderson &
Ortony, 1975; Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell &
Nitsch, 1974), to break free from this notion. These
studies have shown that even unambiguous words vary in
the way in which they are interpreted. Meaning, as it
occurs in human language, is in constant flux, as can
be most clearly demonstrated by neologisms, metaphor,
and our constantly changing lexicon.
An apparent corollary to the idea o-f static
meaning seems to be the idea o-f discrete semantic
components. These components, or features, as they are
termed in semantics, are typically defined as atomic
descriptions of aspect, attribute, orientation, and
relation (or some combination of these). Seen another
way, these semantic primitives are basic units of
information and therefore the building blocks of
meaning. To say something is atomic is to imply that
it cannot be broken down into further components. This
idea is a clear example of atomism. That is, that
there exists a set of semantic primitives,
nondecomposabl e features which combine to create our
understanding of meaning (e.g., the meaning of a word
such as "man" may be defined through the use of
indivisible attributes such as [+animate], C+human],
[+male], [+adult], etc.).
Unfortunately, much work done on semantics in
linguistics (e.g., Bollinger, 1965) seems to assume
that features, by virtue of being atomic, must
therefore be discrete. That is, if we suppose that
there exists some feature on the order o-f , say,
"animation" (i.e., [+/- animate]), current theory seems
to imply that either the feature is there or it is not,
that either an item is animate, or it is not, i.e, a
simple binary choice. This is intuitively appealing,
even quite obvious, but only on the surface.
While we may look at an item and be able to say
with some certainty whether it is or is not animate,
all items which we declare as animate are not
necessarily understood to be so to the same degree.
These differences can be described in terms of either
typicality (Smith, Shoben , & Rips, 1974) or fuzzy class
membership (Oden, 1977), but the idea that atomic
features must be discrete is called into question and
must be reexamined and amended. In fact, Smith et al
(1974) have begun to do so with their
feature-comparison model.
This model splits semantic features into two
groups, those features which may be said to be
defining, i.e., essential to a word's meaning, and
those features which are merely characteristic of the
meaning of a word. Example: for the word "bird" the
feature "flies" would be a defining feature, being seen
as a necessary aspect of "bird;" on the other hand, a
feature such as "sings" would be a characteristic
feature, not a requirement o-f "birdness." This
distinction is a bit strained, as the boundary between
these two types o-f -features is never sharply de-fined,
and in -fact is o-ften rather arbitrary. Still, the idea
that -features, whether defining or characteristic, may
be more or less present in a word is a beginning in the
direction away -from the notion o-f a mandatorily
discrete atomism.
In a similar vein, Oden <1?77) has demonstrated
that class membership cannot be simplified into
"yes/no" dichotomy. Rather, some members of a class
are readily perceived as better exemplars of the
category than other members. For example, while items
such as "table" and "chair" are certainly members of
the class "furniture," other items such as "lamp" or
"mirror" are also viewed as members of the that class,
but not as strongly or to a lesser degree. The notion
of fuzziness and subjective categories is still another
example of viewing meaning as a continuum, rather than
a series of discrete intervals.
In a series of four elegant experiments using cued
recall, Barclay et al
. <1974) examined the influence of
context on the semantic flexibility of words. While
pointing out that researchers had for years been
emphasizing specific attributes and aspects o-f word
meaning to establish the dimensions necessary to test
their own semantic theories, e.g., hierarchical
organization (Collins & Qu i 1 1 i an , 1 972)
,
impl i c i
t
associative responses (Underwood, 1965), or imagery
(Paivio, 1969), Barclay et al . examined this selective
focusing o-f interpretation by observing the e-f-fect o-f
appropriate vs. inappropriate cues on the recall o-f
unambiguous nouns. Their -findings suggest that the
interpretation o-f a word varies as a result o-f its
sentential context. That is, the internal
representation, the meaning or psychological
instantiation, which we create -for a word is a product
o-f the context o-f the word as well as o-f the word
itsel-f. Even an unambiguous word must be disambiguated
from its many and subtly di-f-ferent interpretations, and
this disambiguation can only come about by
incorporating the contextual information into our
understanding o-f the word. Barclay et al.'s (1974)
example clearly illustrates this point:
"Consider,
-for example, the way in which
one's interpretation o-f the unambiguous noun
P
J
*"Q is a-f-fected by verb selection in the
following sentence -frame. The man
(1 i-f ted) (tuned) (smashed) (sat
on) (photographed) the piano . It seems
intuitively that various properties o-f p i ano
are differentially emphasized as a -function
o-f the event described." (p. 472).
Indeed, the p i ano described in each o-f the events
above is at once both the same yet a di-f-ferent piano
from all of the others. Barclay et al . demonstrated
that sentential context influences the interpretation
of nouns by stressing specific attributes of these
nouns. They go on to "suggest that the contextual ly
determined relevance of each of a word's semantic
properties is somehow indicated in the encoded
representation of that word." (p. 479).
Barclay et al
.
concluded by providing a warning
for further research, a warning largely ignored in the
decade since, that concentration and overemphasis on
fixed aspects of meaning have produced a blindness to
the more realistic notion of semantic flexibility.
This leads to the incorrect assumption that the same
internal representation of a word is activated,
regardless of the context, whenever the word is used.
Some research has avoided this pit-fall. For
example, Thomson 6c Tulving <1?70), using their encoding
spec if ici ty model , have demonstrated that "the
effectiveness o-f retrieval cues depends upon the
spec i -fie format o-f the to-be-remembered (TBR) words at
the time o-f their storage, regardless o-f how strongly
the cues are associated with the TBR words in other
situations." <p. 255). That is, the assoc i at i ons wh i ch
are present during the presentation o-f a word will in
turn provide the most powerful cues for later recall.
Associations are perhaps the most obvious aspects of
context, allowing us to relate the word to other
elements in the environment. For example, the word
"doctor" conjures up strong associates such as "nurse"
and "hospital," though these associates are clearly not
part of the meaning of "doctor." The emphasis in an
encoding specificity model is on the relationships
which exist between the word and its environment, and
not upon the effect the context has upon any internal
representation we may form of the word. For example,
attributes such as "skilled" or "knowledgeable" might
be part of an internal representation of the word
"doctor" but which are not external components provided
by the context.
8Barclay et al . go beyond this, however, suggesting
that more is at work than encoding specificity; that it
is rather the whole which in turn affects the nature of
its parts, that the manner in which a noun is
instantiated is determined by the relevance or salience
of each of its semantic properties to the situation, as
defined by the context (see "piano" example above).
Crucial to our understanding here is a distinction
between assoc i at i ons on the one hand, and attr i butes on
the other. While relations of association may be
supported by a model of encoding specificity, such a
model does not necessarily extend to the actual
attributes which make up a word's meaning. The nature
of Barclay et al's piano described above does not
change as a function of context, nor do its
associations. What does change is our perception of
the piano itself, the relevant and salient aspects, the
attributes, which make up our understanding of the
object, whether as a musical instrument, a heavy item
of furniture, etc. In this light we see that it is the
context which cues which of a word's semantic
properties are to be incorporated into the internal
representation, and to what degree.
In a recent study, Greenspan (1984) demonstrated a
distinction between what he called central and
per i pheral attributes o-f word meaning. Central
properties he describes as "those properties which are
typically central to our experiences with the object,"
while peripheral properties "are properties which tend
to be peripheral to our experiences." (p. 2). For
example, music is a central property o-f piano, while
heavy is a peripheral one. At -first glance these may
appear to be rather trivial and obvious distinctions;
however, Greenspan's results suggest that central
properties o-f a word are active in our understanding
any time the item is experienced. This is not the case
with peripheral properties. Greenspan has demonstrated
that priming experiments utilizing peripheral
attributes produced results in line with an encoding
speci-ficity model, i.e., recall o-f the target word was
significantly better when the peripheral cueing
attribute was primed as compared to its use as a cue
without priming, or with di-f-ferent priming. However,
Greenspan's results using central attributes as cues
were quite di-f-ferent. In the case where central
attributes were used, recall o-f target words was not
significantly di-f-ferent whether the cue was
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appropriately or inappropriately primed. Once again
this suggests that an encoding specificity approach is
considerably limited with respect to the study o-f
meaning, or more spec i f i cal 1 y semantic -flexibility.
It is curious that this idea o-f semantic
flexibility has, until quite recently, been all but
ignored in the literature, and that the notion o-f
discrete, as opposed to continuous, semantic -features
is still commonly accepted. An encouraging exception
to this is the composite holographic associative recall
model (CHARM) developed by Eich (1982, 1985). In this
model Eich describes the link associating two items in
memory as the semantic overlap o-f shared features and
the respective weights o-f these
-features, and uses this
link to examine the processes o-f storage and retrieval
in memory.
As a -final note to their 1974 paper, Barclay et
al
.
suggest that some theory or method o-f weighting
semantic
-features, or selectively activating some
-features over others, or perhaps both, would be needed
to adequately describe such o-f semantic
-flexibility.
It is just such a theory which is presented below.
The assumption that semantic
-features exist on a
continuum is part o-f the foundation of a proposed new
11
approach called Variable Feature Theory. The
-flexibility provided by such a continuum cannot be
overstressed. The in-fluence of each -feature may be
scaled in terms o-f its salience to the item's meaning,
permitting in this way the -finer and -finer shades o-f
meaning which language is capable o-f. However,
Variable Feature Theory posits not only semantic
•features which exist along a continuum o-f salience, but
also -features with the ability to move along this
continuum within a word as the situation demands. The
salience o-f -features are always in -flux, and it is the
combination o-f all o-f these variable -features, and
their relative saliences, which makes up our
understanding o-f a word.
To make use o-f Barclay et al.'s piano" example
again, the aspects o-f meaning which are particularly
salient to the interpretation o-f the word are provided
by the context; this contextual in-formation determines
which -features o-f the word are salient, and to what
degree. Those features which are relevant would
increase in their value o-f salience, while those
-features less essential to the immediate meaning o-f the
word would decrease. For example, the feature "heavy"
is relevant and therefore salient in the sentence "the
12
man lifted the piano" while it has little or no
importance to our interpretation in a sentence such as
"the man tuned the piano." With this in mind, it is
easy to understand that the immediate meaning of one
concept (the meaning intended at a particular time, in
a particular context) interacts with and alters the
immediate meaning o-f other concepts that it encounters
whether -from the environment or through use. This is
not a new idea, being in many ways a restatement of
Barclay et al
. (1974) above. What is new is the notion
that these changes occur as a result of changes in the
salience of component features as they move along their
respective continua.
In summary, our understanding of a word is colored
by recent or current context. This does not seem
particularly earth-shattering; in fact it is quite
intuitive, but it is precisely the sort of real-life
phenomenon a theory of semantics needs to be able to
descr i be
.
In one of the few studies to focus on such
"real-life" aspects of semantics, Tabossi (1982)
examined just such phenomena in her investigation of
how context facilitates interpretation. Her study
addressed the question of whether the meaning of a
13
word, drawn -from a sentence as a whole, results -from
the salience of a particular aspect of the word's
meaning. Tabossi presented her subjects with a brief
phrase which highlighted a speci-fic attribute o-f a
target noun, i.e., raised the salience o-f a particular
feature. Hal-f o-f these phrases used verbs which
contained selection restriction cues, that is, the
verbs re-flected some aspect o-f the subject noun, (e.g.,
"the -fire warmed the soldiers in the winter"), while
hal-f the phrases used verbs without any such
restrictions or special relations to their subject
nouns (e.g., "the -fire protected the soldiers"). After
reading each sentence, the subjects per-formed a
verification test. Hal-f o-f these ver i -f i cat i ons were
designed to elicit priming e-f-fects -from the earlier
phrases, that is, they contained the attribute implied
by the phrase (e.g. "fire is hot" -for both the phrases
given above), and hal-f the verifications irrelevant,
unprimed attributes of the phrase's target word (e.g.,
"f i re is br i ght" )
.
Tabossi compared the reaction times gathered from
the verification tasks and found a reliable difference
between primed and unprimed conditions. Tabossi 's
study demonstrated "that a question about a noun is
14
easier if it is preceded by a sentence which primes a
relevant semantic characteristic." <p. 87). This is
consistent with the Barclay et al . results of
appropriate and inappropriate cued recalls, and
reaffirms the importance of context in our
understanding of meaning. The results suggest that,
rather than utilizing all possible information
concerning a word, i n al 1 uses of the word, only
specific and relevant aspects of its meaning are used
for interpretation.
The current studies are an attempt to go somewhat
beyond the atheoretical limits of Tabossi (1982).
While Tabossi demonstrated that the sentential
environment of a word provides the information we use
to generate its meaning, she did not make any
suggestions as to how this process occurred. It was
the goal of the current studies to do just this.
Variable Feature Theory suggests a manner in which
semantic features may move along a continuum of
salience, altering the meaning of a word as they rise
and fall in relevance to that word, depending on the
context of its use. As semantic features are purely a
theoretical notion underlying our language, we cannot
manipulate them directly. Instead, this study uses
15
attr i but i onal norms o-f words with the assumption that
these attributes, being descriptive properties o-f the
words, can serve as measurable representations o-f
semantic
-features. While this assumption is tenuous,
it is not unwarranted. Indeed, it is a long standing
precedent in linguistic theory to conceptualize
semantic features in just this way (Leech, 1974). With
this assumption, we could then manipulate these
attributes, rank them for salience in various contexts
with respect to the same word, and observe the
resulting changes in meaning.
Three main improvements over the Tabossi study
were intended. First, whether for reasons of
simplicity or as a result of the binary tendency
discussed above, Tabossi 's design looked only at pairs
of attributes for each word, and pairs of primes for
each attribute. Accepting the notion of semantic
features existing upon a continuum, the current studies
required at least three items being examined to
demonstrate this middle ground. This has been
included. Secondly, Tabossi 's results are based on a
small number of subjects (16) split into two groups,
each producing a total of thirty-two data points for
their respective conditions. These numbers seem
16
somewhat inadequate, the more so with the inclusion in
this experiment of varying levels o-f salience, where
subtler changes in meaning need to be detected.
Finally, the current studies adopt a more theoretical
context, attempting to relate recent results with
contemporary theories and procedures.
This research was intended to establish certain
relationships between words, their attributes, the
salience o-f these attributes as a result o-f speci-fic
contexts, and the way in which our processing o-f these
words changes as a function of the salience of each
word's attributes. Experiment 1 gathered some
attr i but i onal norms for a small group of nouns <wi th
the assumption that these attributes can be used to
represent semantic features). Experiment 2
demonstrated that the norms, as found in Experiment 1,
are ranked differently in terms of salience in
different contexts. Finally, Experiment 3 was intended
to illustrate that these rankings, which reflect
contextual changes, affect our internal representation,
the meaning, of the nouns.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Subjects . Forty students -from General Psychology
classes participated and received partial credit toward
a course requirement.
Desion and Materials . Words were selected for
this task from the list of 1000 nouns compiled by van
der Veur (1975). The words were selected on the basis
of imagery rating, a scale which ran from one (low
imagery) to seven (high imagery). For the purposes of
this study and as a consequence of time constraints,
only those words with a mean imagery rating above 6.0
were used, based on the assumption that subjects would
generate more attributes in a shorter time period for
high-imagery items than for low. From these words a
list of 54 words was derived, after having been rated
as both concrete and unambiguous by a panel of three
general psychology teaching assistants (see Appendix
A). 50 of these words were used for the task in this
experiment; the remaining four words were used as
examples in the instructions.
Procedure
. The student subjects were informed
that they were part of an e A p<?"iment to establish
attr i but i onal norms for a list of nouns. They were
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presented with a set o-f instructions, as well as one o-f
two lists o-f 25 high-imagery words. The subjects were
requested, via the written instructions, to write as
many characteristic properties o-f each word on the list
as they were able, being further requested to attempt
at least -four such terms per word. Four sample words
were provided, with appropriate properties written in.
The instructions included a clear distinction between
"attributes" and "associations," de-fining the former as
those properties which were considered prototypical or
innate to most or all instances of the word, and the
latter as properties which only occurred for a few or
specific instances of the word, often only in special
or limited context. The experiment instructions read:
The goal of this experiment is to gather as
many characteristic properties for these
nouns as possible. These properties are the
words we use to make up the meaning of other
words. For example, characteristic properties
of the word "fire" would include "is hot,"
"is bright," "burns," etc. These are
attributes of the word "fire" and make up our
understanding of its meaning. In the pages
that follow please try and write four cr ,;,:re
1?
such attributes for each word. Remember, an
attribute is a characteristic property o-f a
word; it describes an innate aspect o-f the
word, something which is typically a part o-f
that word's meaning. Do not con-fuse these
attributes with "associations. 8 Associations
are properties or ideas which are related to
a word, but are not a part o-f its meaning.
Example: All o-f the properties described
above are a part of the word "fire," they are
attributes of the word; an association for
"fire" might be "what happens when I light a
match," or "what burned down my house." These
examples are not innate properties of all or
even most fires, they are only things we may
"associate" with fire, or even with a
specific fire. Attributes, on the other hand,
apply most or all of the time.
Subjects were then given approximately twenty
minutes to generate these characteristic attributes for
the 25 words; they worked at their own speed.
Results and Discussi on
20
The attributes generated by the subjects were then
tabulated in the -following manner. A list o-f every
attribute produced -for each o-f the 50 words by all o-f
the subjects was compiled. Uhere more than one
instance o-f an attribute occurred < the most common
case) a tally was made o-f the -frequency o-f the term.
These 50 lists were then -further condensed by treating
synonymous < as judged by the experimenter and two
undergraduate assistants, requiring two-thirds
agreement -for synonymity) attributes, between subjects,
as identical, simply increasing the -frequency o-f the
appropriate attribute. Example: synonymous attributes
for the word "elephant" such as "large" and "big"
produced by di-f-ferent subjects were considered separate
instances o-f the same attribute and were recorded as
two entries o-f "large."
A-fter establishing the at tr i bu t i onal norms and
their relative
-frequencies for each o-f the 50 nouns, a
list o-f 18 nouns was then derived
-for Experiment 2 (see
Appendix B)
. This new list was composed o-f those nouns
possessing at least -five attributes, each o-f which was
produced by at least sixty percent o-f the subjects (see
Appendix C>
. In the cases where more than -five such
attributes were available, the top -five attributes (in
21
terms o-f -frequency) were selected. These materials
were then used in Experiment 2 to establish the ranked
order o-f salience -for each set of -five attributes in
each o-f three di-f-ferent contexts.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Subjects
. Sixty subjects -from the same subject
pool as used in Experiment 1 participated in one o-f
three groups o-f twenty individuals each.
Design and Materials . Based on three o-f the -five
h
i
gh—frequency (sixty percent or higher) at tr i bu t i onal
norms established
-for 18 o-f the nouns -from Experiment
1, contextual priming phrases were created for each
noun (see Appendix D) . Each o-f the three phrases -for
each noun emphasized an aspect o-f the noun's meaning
which was exemplified or directly related to one o-f the
noun's -five attributes. In other words, short
sentences which -focused on a single aspect of each
word's meaning were produced for each of three of the
noun's five attributes (as produced by Experiment 1).
Example: sentences for the word "elephant" might be
"the elephant filled the room," "elephants are drab
looking," and "the elephant squirted water" emphasizing
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the attributes "is large," "is grey," and "has a
trunk," respectively.
The three (out o-f -five) attributes used in these
phrases were chosen by the experimenter on the basis of
diversity, that is, the three attributes were selected
to provide as wide a range of context as possible when
used to create the phrases. All three phrases for each
of the 18 nouns were reviewed and acknowledged as
actually emphasizing the indicated attribute by a panel
of four graduate students in cognitive psychology who,
when presented with the noun and sentence, responded
with the appropriate attribute.
The 54 phrases were then divided into three lists,
such that no list contained the same noun more than
once. That is, each of the three phrases produced for
each noun was in a different list. Testing materials
consisted of sheets with each noun, a priming phrase
for that noun, and the noun's five attributes presented
respectively. For example, re-ferring back to the
example with "elephant" used earlier, the noun is
"elephant," the phrase "the elephant filled the room,"
and the attributes would be "is large," "is grey," "has
large ears," "has a trunk," and "has tusks." The order
23
o-f each subject's 18 exercises was randomized, as were
the order o-f the -five attributes within each exercise.
Procedure . The subjects were presented with the
described materials and were asked to read the noun,
the phrase, and five attributes, and then to rank the
attributes (-for that context) in terms o-f salience by
numbering them one through five, with one being most
important or salient, and five meaning least important
or salient. Several sets of sample nouns, phrases, and
attribute lists were provided as examples and had been
pre-ranked to illustrate to the subjects how to perform
the task (see Table 1). Materials were organized such
that no subject received the same noun more than once,
that is, the subjects in each of the three groups
received only one of the three context phrases for each
of the nouns. Subjects worked at their own rate and
performed this task on each of the 18 nouns provided.
Results and Discussion
A two-way analysis of variance was performed for
the three levels of context and five levels of
attributes for each of the 18 words. No main effect of
context, nor a context x attribute interaction could be
determined, due the nature of the measure which
required subjects to rank attributes using values one
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through -five, by de-f i n i t i on summing to -fifteen in every
context. The analysis -focused on the main e-f-fect o-f
attributes. Significance levels o-f at least 2. < .05
(see Tables 2.1 through 2.18) were -found -for 16 o-f the
18 words, with remaining two words approaching
significance at £ < .08, providing clear support -for
the intuitive notion that context produces changes in
the salience o-f the individual aspects o-f meaning.
Averages of salience ratings for each attribute of
each phrase were then obtained by collapsing across the
twenty subjects for each group. The average saliences
of the attributes in each of the 54 phrases provides a
crude measure of the relative ratings of the variable
features these attributes may be said to represent.
Specifically, the presentation of each phrase provides
a context for its respective noun, a context which
specifies a unique meaning for that noun from other
contexts (see Tables 2.1 through 2.18). This
uniqueness is shown by the change in ranking of the
attributes for each noun across three different
contexts (as provided by the phrases). That is, the
change in ranking reflects a change in the understood
relative salience of the five attributes, which may be
conceptualized as components of the noun's meaning.
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The idea that meaning is not static but rather
•fluctuates is thus clearly and simply demonstrated.
EXPERIMENT 3
This experiment was intended to demonstrate the
effect of meaning on reaction time as a -function o-f
context. An inherent assumption in studies treating
meaning as static is that the reaction time to
verification questions will likewise remain constant
across contexts. That is, that regardless o-f which
primes or cues are used, subjects will respond at a
constant rate. Such results might be explained in
terms o-f Greenspan's central properties, which appear
to be active whether specifically primed or not.
However, assuming semantic flexibility (as demonstrated
in Experiment 2 above) as the norm, a variable set of
reaction times would be anticipated, with the swifter
reaction times corresponding to the more salient
attributes as appropriately primed by each context.
Studies of semantics which make use of reaction
time measures do so with the understanding that the
amount of time required reflects the operation of some
cognitive processes, such as spreading activation
through relevant pathways of a network or searches
through some form of semantic hierarchy. Variable
26
Feature Theory suggests that the paths traced in such a
network or hierarchy are determined by the salience o-f
the components or attributes which create our
understanding o-f a word, as determined by context. In
a verification situation, it is predicted that swi-fter
reaction times would result where the salience ratings
o-f the attributes o-f the word, as provided by the
context o-f the priming phrase, most closely matches the
salience ratings o-f the attributes o-f that word as
produced by the context o-f the cue.
Method
Subjects
. Seventy-two subjects, selected -from the
same pool as in Experiments 1 and 2 above, were divided
into three groups o-f twenty—four each and tested
individual ly.
Desion and Materials
. The same nouns, priming
phrases, and attributes used in Experiment 2 above were
used in this experiment as well (see Appendices E, F,
and G)
.
Greenspan (1984) selected the central
properties o-f his nouns through recourse to a
dictionary, the "central properties were always listed
in the dictionary de-finition o-f the nouns." (p. 4).
Along similar lines, Greenspan de-fined peripheral
properties as those which did not appear in the
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dictionary definition. While the -former definition
seems acceptable, i f somewhat arbitrary, the latter has
absolutely no constraints placed upon it all. For
purposes of comparison with the Greenspan study, the
current study defined the attribute most frequently
generated for each word in Experiment 1 as a central
attribute, while the remaining two attributes were
labeled as peripheral attributes, insuring that all
attributes were indeed appropriate attributes for the
given word, a restriction not made clear in the
Greenspan study. The labeling procedure was used on
the basis that attributes which are more central to a
word's meaning would more likely be generated than more
peripheral attributes.
A BASIC computer program was written which would
display first the noun and the the priming phrase on a
CRT. The program further displayed a verification
question of the form 'Does A have B?" or Is A B?" in
which "A" is the noun, and "B" one of the noun's
attributes (see Table 2 for example). The attribute
presented as "B" was always one of the three attributes
used in Experiment 2. Each of the 18 nouns with each
of its three priming phrases paired with each of the
three possible target attributes for "B" in the
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verification question were presented in this -fashion.
More simply, all three of each noun's priming phrases
were presented paired with all three possible target
attributes for a total o-f nine presentations per noun,
or a total o-f 162 for all 18 nouns. The 162
presentations were divided into three lists of 54
presentations, such that no subject received more than
one occurrence of each of a noun's priming phrases, nor
more than one occurrence of each of a noun's target
attributes. More specifically, by the end of the
session, each subject had received, for each noun, a
matched pair of priming phrase and an appropriate
target attribute, as well as two mismatched pairs <a
different priming phrase with a noncorrespondi ng target
attribute, see Table 3). The correct response to the
verification questions for each of these presentations
was always a positive "yes." In addition, 54 negative
dummy" presentations were included in each of the
three lists, (also of the form "Does A have B?" or "Is
A B?") created from the remaining nouns used in
Experiment 1. The order of the total one hundred-eight
presentations was randomized for each subject.
Procedure
. Each subject was seated before an
Apple 11+ microcomputer and Zenith green monitor.
2?
Subjects were in-formed, via instructions printed on the
monitor, that they were taking part in a verification
task. Specifically, they were told they would be
presented with a word, a short sentence containing that
word, and then asked a question about that word. Their
task, they were told, would be to respond correctly as
quickly as possible. The instructions explained that
the answer to the question would either be true or
-false and indicated which keys to strike on the
computer's keyboard to indicate their response.
Subjects were questioned concerning their handedness,
and the "true" was matched to their dominant hand.
Subjects were given 15 practice presentations and then
received one o-f the three lists o-f 108 presentations.
For each presentation the noun was presented at
the top o-f the CRT, followed by a blank line and then
the priming phrase. Three more blank lines then
followed, and then, after an approximate two second
delay, the verification question. All of the text on
the screen was left-justified and remained there until
the subject made a response. A timing mechanism began
keeping time upon completion of printing the
verification question and ended as soon as the subject
responded either positively or negatively.
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Reaction times -for each word were averaged for
each of the three counterbalanced groups, yielding nine
mean responses per word. The anticipated result was a
clear relationship between response time and the
interaction of the two wi th i n-subjec ts variables
<priming phrase and target attribute). Specifically,
shorter response times were expected where the target
attribute was rated as closer to the priming phrase, as
scaled in Experiment 2, that is, as attributes are
placed lower with respect to salience in a given
context (priming phrase), they will require a greater
amount of time to verify in a task based upon that
context
.
Results and Discussion
Of the original 18 nouns used, three nouns, and
their requisite primes and cues, were dropped from the
study due to ambiguous or inconsistent statements
resulting from prime-cue pairings, e.g., for the prime:
"THE SKY WAS CLEAR" the cue: "DOES THE SKY HAUE
CLOUDS?" would in fact be false. The remaining 15
nouns were further broken down into their sets of three
priming phrases or contexts. Each of the these 45
items contained subjects' response times to one of
three different prime-cue combinations. A one-way
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analysis o-f variance with unequal cell -frequencies was
performed on each o-f the forty-five items, with three
levels o-f cue, one appropriate to the prime, and two
inappropriate cues (see Table 3). O-f the 45 tests
performed, 22 were significant at the £. < .05 level.
However, when the reaction times were ranked in the
predicted order obtained from the salience ratings of
Experiment 2 (see Tables 4.1 through 4.15) only five of
the 45 items produced the parallel ordering predicted,
and of these five, only three contained significant
differences. Serious consideration should be given to
the possibility that this small handful of predicted
results is the product of a very probable alpha error.
No consistent or systematic pattern of reaction
times, as a function of the relationship between prime
and appropriate cue, was found. This is contrary to
the results observed in the Tabossi (1982) study, and
those anticipated here. The actual results suggest
that the attribute made salient by the priming phrase
produces no observable effect (as measured by reaction
times) on interpretation of the word, regardless of the
context provided by the verification cue (i.e.,
appropriate or otherwise). However, these results do
not provide support for a static meaning interpretation
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either. If interpreted meaning were in -fact remaining
constant, then no variation in reaction time across
different cues should be observed; this was the case
•for only 23 of the of the 45 reaction time analyses.
Likewise no main effect of central over peripheral
cues were found as would be suggested by the Greenspan
(1984) study. It should be noted however, that a
different procedure was used in determining central and
peripheral properties in the present study than was
employed by Greenspan. Those attributes labeled as
central to a given word's meaning did not
systematically produce briefer reaction times, either
within or across primes, and in some cases produced
significantly slower reaction times. While the method
of selection of central and peripheral properties
differed from that employed by Greenspan, the method
used still appears sound, repli cable, and more
empirically defensible than Greenspan's.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
If we acknowledge the importance of context on our
understanding of meaning, and its influence on our
interpretation of unambiguous words, then any
experiment which attempts to study semantic processes
must begin by somehow establishing or determining which
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aspects of meaning are salient in the given context.
Such procedures, however, tend in previous research to
be the exception rather than the norm. In the current
studies Experiment 1 was performed to generate the
actual attributes which would be used in the other two
experiments. This experiment was per-formed explicitly
in this study in part due to the conspicuous lack in
similar studies. Ulh i 1 e many researchers report the
source -for part o-f the materials they use, such as one
or another published word list, the origin o-f other
materials such as the attributes being tested or the
priming phrases employed are o-ften not mentioned.
Studies o-f semantics designed to provide some insight
into our use o-f language should re-flect natural
language use, as revealed in the gathering of
materials. Whether more contrived or convenient
methods are in use in previous research can only be
speculated, as evidence to the contrary is not commonly
presented. Experiment 1 o-f the current research was
per-formed to increase the controls on the materials
used, by decreasing the likelihood o-f some systematic
influence of the experimenter and his assistants in
producing the materials themselves.
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Experiment 2 was performed to provide salience
rankings o-f various attributes in each of three
contexts -for the nouns being examined. Again, the
ranking was performed experimentally rather than
through some more arbitrary procedure such as utilizing
dictionary definitions. The obtained results support
the idea o-f semantic flexibility, as demonstrated by
changes in attribute rankings across different
contexts, and are consistent with the Variable Feature
explanation that features, as measured experimentally
by attributes, change in salience ratings as a function
of context. This also provided a base-line to compare
other measures, specifically reaction time data,
against, with the not unreasonable prediction that
results from other measures would parallel those
obtained in Experiment 2. However, the totally
idiosyncratic results from Experiment 3 appear to belie
this idea. Not only were the results from the two
measures non-parallel, but the more obvious
relationship of swifter response times to appropriately
primed cues was also lacking. Subjects produced
reaction times for appropriately matched primes and
cues which did not vary significantly from reaction
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times resulting -from inappropriately matched pairs, or
which were even significantly higher.
Likewise the rather powerful effect found by
Greenspan <1?84) of swifter response times to cues
using central attributes as compared to cues using
peripheral attributes was also absent. It is
conceivable that the different procedures used in
labeling central and peripheral properties between the
present study and Greenspan's experiment, and the
subsequent variance in control may be responsible for
these resul ts.
The lack of results comparable with either the
Tabossi or Greenspan studies is worth noting.
Tabossi 's results suggest a parallel to encoding
specificity, that is, swifter reaction times are
expected for appropriately matched priming attribute
and cued attribute than for inappropriate matches.
Greenspan's results parallel those obtained by Tabossi,
but only with respect to peripheral properties.
Reaction times to primed central properties did not
differ significantly across appropriate or
inappropriate central cues, or appropriate peripheral
matches. That neither set of results was obtained by
Experiment 3 is perhaps more striking than the
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anticipated result of a replication of one o-f the two
positions alone. It should be noted, that while in the
Tabossi study each subject served as his/her own
control by receiving each item twice, producing twice
as many data points per subject, subjects in the
current study received each item -from their respective
1 i sts onl y once
.
Perhaps the explanation o-f such disparate results
can be -found in Experiment 1. The nouns and attributes
used in both Experiments 2 and 3 were generated by
subjects during the -first experiment. Neither Tabossi
<1?82) nor Greenspan (1984) state where their
experimental materials originated, and it may be
assumed that they were generated by the experimenters
themselves. It is possible that by using materials
generated by the procedure in Experiment 1 that some
form o-f experimenter error was added to the studies in
such a way as to render the results unintelligible.
Along a similar line, as discussed above, the lack of
an experimental procedure (such as used in Experiment
1 ) by other researchers may have resulted in some
systematic effect, insuring some form of consistent but
spurious results.
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Another possible explanation -for the results
obtained in Experiment 3 can be -found by examining the
procedure used in Experiment 2, specifically the
ordering method imposed upon subjects. By requiring
subjects to order attributes consecutively without
duplication or omission of the values one through -five
it is possible that an art i factual ranking may have
occurred. Such an artifact would might in fact produce
differently ranked attributes where, if subjects'
ranking in Experiment 2 had been free to vary, no such
significant difference might actually exist. However,
while such an artifact might indeed disrupt the
predicted order over three cues, it seems unlikely that
it would have much effect upon central properties, as
defined for use in this study. As noted earlier, no
effect of central properties were observed.
Additionally, the procedure used in Experiment 3
may be suspect. Uhereas subjects were presented with
the noun, the priming phrase, and, after a delay, the
cue it is possible that subjects used the initial noun
as a prime, which would suggest that a default or core
set of attributes were being activated. Likewise, it
is not unreasonable to assume that subjects may have
been ignoring both noun and priming phrase entirely,
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and responded to the verification task based solely on
the cue, which would likewise suggest the priming of
central properties.
Still another possible explanation -for the -failure
to obtain the predicted results may be traced to the
different measures used in Experiments 2 and 3. The
critical difference between the two procedures appears
to be time. In Experiment 2 subjects were permitted to
work at their own rate, taking approximately twenty
minutes to rank all 18 words, each in its own context.
On the other hand, clearly time is the crucial factor
in a reaction time task such as in Experiment 3.
Perhaps the rankings obtained in Experiment 2 are only
possible when subjects have sufficient opportunity to
deliberate, and as such have little or no bearing upon
more rapid judgments of salience.
It is conceivable that the changes in salience of
various attributes produced by the priming phrase are
not sufficiently established or accessible in the brief
period between prime and verification cue in Experiment
3. Such a possibility could easily be tested
empirically by altering the procedure in Experiment 3
such that subjects received primes for all words, and
only after this point were tested for reaction time to
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verification cues. Even more simply, replicating
Experiment 3 with a greater delay between presentation
o-f priming phrase and cue should provide similar
results if the interval is indeed critical. Clearly
then, these and other tollowup experiments can and
should be performed to -further examine the effect of
time in semantic flexibility.
Variable Feature Theory includes the notion that
semantic flexibility is an ongoing process occurring
over time. It is intuitively obvious that our
understanding of a word is colored not only by the
current context, but by our experience as well. This
suggests the idea that experience provides us with a
"core" meaning, what Greenspan might describe as the
central meaning of a word, or what we could
conceptualize as a word's default meaning, or likewise
as the interpreted meaning in the absence of any other
contextual cues. An important distinction between this
and Greenspan's notion of the central/peripheral
dichotomy is that Variable Feature Theory describes all
features as existing on a continuum, as compared to
Greenspan's sharply defined dichotomy. While the idea
of a central or core meaning is intuitively appealing,
there is no need to abandon the idea of continuous
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flexibility. Ue can conceptualize words which possess
two or more central properties, and in which one
property is perceived as either more or less central
than the other properties. Greenspan instead seems to
suggest semantic flexibility only for peripheral
properties, and a rigid, unchanging role for central
properties. Like so many others, the distinction is
one that can, and should, be tested empirically.
In all, further replications must be considered,
both of the current study, and of previous research,
utilizing better controls. Careful scrutiny must be
given to prior semantic research which has made use of
reaction time procedures but which have not established
which interpretation of a word's meaning is being
instantiated by subjects. Without performing some form
of pretest (as done here with Experiment 2) which can
measure the relative saliences of a word's attributes,
a precise measure of the size of the effect found in a
reaction time task is at best problematical. Different
reaction times can be expected for the same word in
response to the same question as a function of the
priming phrase. A pretest which establishs salience
ratings for variable features in specific contexts
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produces a scale against which each item's reaction
time can be measured,
-for each context tested.
42
REFERENCES
Anderson, R.C. & Ortony, A. (1975). On putting apples
into bottles—A problem of polysemy. Coon i t i ve
Psychol ooy . 7, 167-180.
Barclay, J.R., Brans-ford, J.D., Franks, J.J.,
McCarrell, N.S., fcNitsch, K. (1974). Comprehension
and semantic -flexibility. Journal o-f Verbal Learn i no
and Verbal Behavior . 13 . 471-481.
Bollinger, D. (1965). The atomization o-f meaning.
Lanouaoe . 41 . 555-573.
Collins, A.M. & Qu i 1 1 i an , M.R. (1969). Retrieval time
from semantic memory. Journal o-f Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior . 8, 240-248.
Collins, A.M. & Qu i 1 1 i an , M.R. (1972). How to make a
language user. In E. Tulving 4 U. Donaldson (Eds.),
Organization o-f memory . New York: Academic Press.
Eich, J.M. (1982). A composite holographic associative
recall model. Psychol ooi cal Review . 89
.
627-661.
Eich, J.M. (1985). Levels o-f processing, encoding
specificity, elaboration, and CHARM. Psychol ooi cal
Revj_ew, 92, 1-38.
Glass, A.L. ic Holyoak, K.J. (1975). Alternative
conceptions of semantic memory. Coon i t i on . 3,
313-339.
43
Leech, G. <1974). Seman t i cs . New York: Penguin Books.
Meyer, D.E. (1970). Long-term memory retrieval during
the comprehension o-f a-f -f i rmat i ve and negative
sentences. In R.A. Kennedy ic A.L. Wilkes <Eds.),
Studies in lono-term memory . London: John Uiley &
Sons.
Oden, G.C. (1977). Fuzziness in semantic memory:
Choosing exemplars o-f subjective categories. Memory
and Coon i t i on . 5, 198-204.
Paivio, A. (1969). Mental imagery in associative
learning and memory. Psychol ooi cal Review . 76,
241-263.
Smith, E.E. (1978). Theories o-f semantic memory. In
Cognitive Processes . Vol . 6. New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Smith, E.E., Shoben , E.J. & Rips, L.J. (1974).
Structure and process in semantic memory: A -featural
model -for semantic decisions. Psychological Review .
81, 214-241.
Tabossi
,
P. (1982). Sentential context and the
interpretation o-f unambiguous words. Quar ter 1 y
Journal o-f Experimental Psychol ooy . 34A, 79-90.
44
Thomson, D.M. fcTulving, E. (1970). Associative
encoding and retrieval: Weak and strong cues.
Journal o-f Experimental Psychology
. 86, 255-262.
Underwood, B.J. <1?65). False recognition produced by
implicit verbal response. Journal o-f Experimental
Psychol ooy . 70, 122-129.
an der Veur, B.U. (1975). Imagery rating o-f 1,000
-frequently used words. Journal o-f Educational
Psychology
. 67 . 44-56.
v
45
Appendix A
Nouns Used in Experiment 1
HILL CHAIR
POTATOES WATER
OCEAN BARN
BOOK EGGS
HANDKERCHIEF ICE
CANDLES STREET
CLOCK BOOTS
KNIFE LUNCH
HAIR APPLES
FOOTBALL CAT
FOREST MUD
ELEPHANT SUN
SKY BUTTERFLY
ARMY UMBRELLA
COWBOY CHEESE
DIME CLOWN
CHIMNEY ROPE
DOOR
INK
WINDOW
MILK
SAND
PICNIC
CABBAGE
RAIN
FIREPLACE
BOTTLE
AIRPLANE
BLACKBOARD
KITE
CARROTS
SNOW
PUMPKIN
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Appendix 6
Nouns Used in Experiment 2
DOOR
OCEAN
EGGS
ICE
PICNIC
MUD
SKY
ARMY
PUMPKIN
POTATOES
BOOK
HANDKERCHIEF
CANDLES
CLOCK
ELEPHANT
BUTTERFLY
DIME
CHIMNEY
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Appendix C
Attributes Used in Experiment 2
CAN OPEN
IS RECTANGULAR
ARE EDIBLE
ARE WHITE
IS DEEP
IS SALTY
HAS PAGES
HAS A TITLE
HAVE A YOLK
ARE BREAKABLE
IS CLOTH
IS WHITE
IS COLD
IS SOLID
ARE WAX
ARE ROMANTIC
IS WOODEN
IS AN ENTRANCE
HAVE A PEEL
HAVE EYES
IS BLUE
HAS FISH
HAS COVERS
MADE OF PAPER
ARE OVAL
ARE SLIMY
IS SQUARE
IS ORNAMENTAL
GIVES LIGHT
SMELL NICE
HAS A KNOB
GROW IN GROUND
IS LARGE
HAS WORDS
HAVE A SHELL
USED TO BLOW NOSE
IS FROZEN WATER CAN MELT
IS CLEAR
ARE BURNT
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HAS FOOD
IS MESSY
HAS TIME
TICKS
IS BLACK
IS UET
IS GREY
HAS TUSKS
IS BLUE
HAS STARS
IS AN INSECT
IS SMALL
HAS UNIFORMS
PROTECTS
IS SILVER
IS SMALL
IS ORANGE
IS EDIBLE
IS OUTDOOR
HAS ANTS
HAS HANDS
HAS AN ALARM
IS COLD
IS DIRTY
IS BIG
HAS LARGE EARS
HAS CLOUDS
IS ABOVE US
IS COLORFUL
IS DELICATE
HAS WEAPONS
IS STRICT
IS ROUND
IS THIN
HAS SEEDS
HAS A STEM
IS FUN
HAS NUMBERS
IS SQUISHY
HAS A TRUNK
IS ENDLESS
FLUTTERS
FIGHTS
IS MONEY
IS ROUND
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HAS BRICKS HAS SMOKE IS SOOTY
IS SQUARE IS TALL
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Appendix D
Priminq Sentences Used in Experiment 2
THE DOOR WAS LATCHED
THE DOOR IS VARNISHED
THE DOOR HAS HINGES
THE POTATOES WERE SCRUBBED
THE POTATOES WERE PLANTED
THE POTATOES TASTED GOOD
IT TAKES A LONGS TIME TO CROSS THE OCEAN
THE OCEAN REFLECTS THE SKY
THE OCEAN IS VIRTUALLY BOTTOMLESS
SHE FLIPPED THROUGH THE BOOK
THE BOOK WAS BOUND
THE BOOK CAN BE READ
HE LIKES HIS EGGS RUNNY
THE SCRAMBLED EGGS WERE CRUNCHY
THEY ROLLED THE EGGS
THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS SOFT
CARRY A HANDKERCHIEF WHEN YOU HAVE A COLD
THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS FOLDED
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HE MADE ICE CUBES
HE DROPPED ICE CUBES INTO HIS LEMONADE
THE ICE DRIPPED
HE LIT THE CANDLES
THE CANDLES DRIPPED
THE CANDLES SHONE IN THE UINDOU
IT WAS A PERFECT DAY FOR A PICNIC
HE ATE TOO MUCH AT THE PICNIC
THEY ENJOYED THE PICNIC
IT WAS A DONALD DUCK ALARM CLOCK
HE LOOKED AT THE CLOCK TO SEE IF HE WAS LATE
IT WAS A DIGITAL CLOCK
THE MUD-PACK MADE HER SHIVER
THE MUD WAS DARK
THE MUD OOZED THROUGH HER TOES
THE ELEPHANT FILLED THE ROOM
ELEPHANTS ARE DRAB LOOKING
THE ELEPHANT SQUIRTED WATER
THE SKY WAS OVERCAST
THE SKY STRETCHES BEYOND THE HORIZON
THE SKY WAS CLEAR
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BUTTERFLIES REMIND HIM OF FLOWERS
BUTTERFLIES UJERE ONCE CATERPILLARS
THE BUTTERFLIES MOVED FROM FLOWER TO FLOWER
THE ARMY IS TRAINED FOR WARFARE
THE ARMY IS WELL TRAINED
EVERYONE IN THE ARMY DRESSES ALIKE
HE RECEIVED A DIME AS CHANGE
HE PUT THE DIMES INTO A ROLL
THE DIME WAS METAL
THEY ROLLED PUMPKINS DOWN THE HILL
THEY PLANTED PUMPKINS
THE PUMPKINS ARE BRIGHT
THE CHIMNEY HADN'T BEEN CLEANED IN A LONG TIME
THE CHIMNEY WAS RED
THE CHIMNEY'S FLUE WAS OPEN
Appendix E
Nouns Used in Experiment 3
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DOOR
OCEAN
EGGS
ICE
PICNIC
ELEPHANT
DIME
CHIMNEY
POTATOES
BOOK
HANDKERCHIEF
CANDLES
MUD
BUTTERFLY
PUMPKIN
Appendix F
Attributes Used in Experiment 3
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CAN OPEN
ARE EDIBLE
IS DEEP
HAS PAGES
HAVE A YOLK
IS CLOTH
IS COLD
ARE WAX
HAS FOOD
IS BLACK
IS GREY
IS AN INSECT
IS SILVER
IS ORANGE
HAS BRICKS
IS WOODEN
HAVE A PEEL
IS BLUE
HAS COVERS
ARE OVAL
IS SQUARE
IS FROZEN WATER
GIVES LIGHT
IS OUTDOOR
IS COLD
IS BIG
IS COLORFUL
IS ROUND
HAS SEEDS
HAS SMOKE
HAS A KNOB
GROW IN GROUND
IS LARGE
HAS WORDS
HAVE A SHELL
USED TO BLOW NOSE
CAN MELT
ARE BURNT
IS FUN
IS SQUISHY
HAS A TRUNK
FLUTTERS
IS MONEY
IS ROUND
IS SOOTY
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Appendix G
Priminq Sentences Used in Experiment 3
THE DOOR WAS LATCHED
THE DOOR IS VARNISHED
THE DOOR HAS HINGES
THE POTATOES WERE SCRUBBED
THE POTATOES WERE PLANTED
THE POTATOES TASTED GOOD
IT TAKES A LONGS TIME TO CROSS THE OCEAN
THE OCEAN REFLECTS THE SKY
THE OCEAN IS VIRTUALLY BOTTOMLESS
SHE FLIPPED THROUGH THE BOOK
THE BOOK WAS BOUND
THE BOOK CAN BE READ
HE LIKES HIS EGGS RUNNY
THE SCRAMBLED EGGS WERE CRUNCHY
THEY ROLLED THE EGGS
THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS SOFT
CARRY A HANDKERCHIEF WHEN YOU HAi'E A UOLD
THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS FOLDED
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HE MADE ICE CUBES
HE DROPPED ICE CUBES INTO HIS LEMONADE
THE ICE DRIPPED
HE LIT THE CANDLES
THE CANDLES DRIPPED
THE CANDLES SHONE IN THE WINDOW
IT WAS A PERFECT DAY FOR A PICNIC
HE ATE TOO MUCH AT THE PICNIC
THEY ENJOYED THE PICNIC
THE MUD-PACK MADE HER SHIVER
THE MUD WAS DARK
THE MUD OOZED THROUGH HER TOES
THE ELEPHANT FILLED THE ROOM
ELEPHANTS ARE DRAB LOOKING
THE ELEPHANT SQUIRTED WATER
BUTTERFLIES REMIND HIM OF FLOWERS
BUTTERFLIES WERE ONCE CATERPILLARS
THE BUTTERFLIES MOVED FROM FLOWER TO FLOWER
HE RECEIVED A DIME AS CHANGE
HE PUT THE DIMES INTO A ROLL
THE DIME WAS METAL
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THEY ROLLED PUMPKINS DOWN THE HILL
THEY PLANTED PUMPKINS
THE PUMPKINS ARE BRIGHT
THE CHIMNEY HADN'T BEEN CLEANED IN A LONG TIME
THE CHIMNEY WAS RED
THE CHIMNEY'S FLUE WAS OPEN
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Table 1
Practice Examples Presented to Experiment 2 Subjects
WATER
HE SAW THE TINY FISH SWir-t-IING IN THE WATER
IS WET IS CLEAR IS DRUNK IS A LIQUID
3 15 2 IS COOL4
WATER
SHE WAS VERY THIRSTY
IS WET IS CLEAR IS DRUNK
3 5 1
IS A LIQUID IS COOL
4 2
5?
Table 2.1
Mean Salience Ratincis -from Experiment 2: POOR
<1> THE DOOR WAS LATCHED
<2> THE DOOR IS VARNISHED
<3> THE DOOR HAS HINGES
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
IS AN ENTRANCE 2.30 2.65 2.75
IS RECTANGULAR 4.30 3.85 3.75
HAS A KNOB 2.25 3.00 3.35
IS WOODEN 4.10 3.85 1 .55
CAN OPEN 2.05 1 .65 3.60
F<4,57) = 34, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.2
Mean Salience Ratinos -from Experiment 2: POTATOES
<1> THE POTATOES WERE SCRUBBED
<2> THE POTATOES WERE PLANTED
<3> THE POTATOES TASTED GOOD
Pr ime
<1> <2> <3>
GROW IN GROUND 2.30 3.35 1 .15
HAVE A PEEL 2.55 2.85 3.30
ARE EDIBLE 2.25 1.35 2.75
HAVE EYES 4.35 4.35 3.70
ARE WHITE 3.55 3.10 4.10
F<4,57) = 10, £ < .001 .
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Table 2.3
Mean Salience Ratinos -from Experiment 2; OCEAN
<1> IT TAKES A LONGS TIME TO CROSS THE OCEAN
<2> THE OCEAN REFLECTS THE SKY
<3> THE OCEAN IS VIRTUALLY BOTTOMLESS
IS LARGE
IS BLUE
IS DEEP
HAS FISH
IS SALTY
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
1 .30 2.30 2.20
3.85 3.30 1 .55
2.00 1 .20 2.75
4.40 4.05 4.70
3.45 4.30 3.80
F<4,57> = 2, p_ < .08.
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Table 2.4
Mean Salience Ratinos -from Experiment 2: BOOK
(1) SHE FLIPPED THROUGH THE BOOK
<2> THE BOOK WAS BOUND
<3) THE BOOK CAN BE READ
Pr ime
<1> <2> (3)
HAS WORDS 2.75 1 .25 4.55
HAS COVERS 3.70 4.30 2.85
HAS PAGES 1 .80 3.45 3.00
HAS A TITLE 3.55 2.45 2.50
MADE OF PAPER 3.20 3.55 2.10
F<4,57) = 30, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.5
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: EGGS
<1> HE LIKES HIS EGGS RUNNY
(2) THE SCRAMBLED EGGS UERE CRUNCHY
<3> THEY ROLLED THE EGGS
Pr ime
<1> <2> <3>
HAVE A SHELL 3.65 1 .95 1 .45
ARE OVAL 4.40 1 .30 3.85
HAVE A YOLK 1 .95 3.90 3.05
ARE BREAKABLE 3.20 2.95 2.60
ARE SLIMY 1 .80 4.90 4.05
F<4,57> = 59, p_ < .001
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Table 2.6
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: HANDKERCHIEF
<1> THE HANDKERCHIEF UAS SOFT
(2) CARRY A HANDKERCHIEF WHEN YOU HAVE A COLD
<3> THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS FOLDED
Pr ime
(1) (2) (3)
USED TO BLOW NOSE 2.05 3.65 1 .15
IS SQUARE 3.50 2.25 3.40
IS CLOTH 1 .55 2.00 2.05
IS ORNAMENTAL 4.65 3.65 4.70
IS WHITE 3.25 3.45 3.70
F<4,57) = 2, p_ < .08.
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Table 2.7
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: ICE
<1) HE MADE ICE CUBES
<2> HE DROPPED ICE CUBES INTO HIS LEMONADE
(3) THE ICE DRIPPED
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
CAN MELT 4.50 1.85 4.20
IS FROZEN UATER 1 .65 2.45 2.30
IS COLD 2.20 3.20 1 .50
IS CLEAR 4.20 3.75 4.10
IS SOLID 2.45 3.75 2.90
F<4,57) = 29, p_ < .001.
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Table 2.8
Mean Salience Ratings from Experiment 2: CANDLES
<1) HE LIT THE CANDLES
(2) THE CANDLES DRIPPED
<3> THE CANDLES SHONE IN THE WINDOW
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
ARE BURNT 2.65 2.60 2.05
GIVE LIGHT 1 .75 1 .45 2.85
ARE WAX 3.00 3.40 1 .50
SMELL NICE 3.85 4.20 4.05
ARE ROMANTIC 3.75 3.35 4.55
F<4,57> = 4, p_ < .01 .
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Table 2.9
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: PICNIC
(1) IT WAS A PERFECT DAY FOR A PICNIC
(2) HE ATE TOO MUCH AT THE PICNIC
<3> THEY ENJOYED THE PICNIC
Pr ime
<1> <2> (3)
IS FUN 2.10 2.60 2.80
IS OUTDOOR 1 .75 1 .80 2.50
HAS FOOD 2.35 1 .80 1.35
HAS ANTS 4.70 5.00 4.55
IS MESSY 4.10 3.80 3.80
F<4,57) = 3, p_ < .05.
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Table 2.10
Mean Salience Ratinos -from Experiment 2: CLOCK
<1> IT WAS A DONALD DUCK ALARM CLOCK
(2) HE LOOKED AT THE CLOCK TO SEE IF HE WAS LATE
<3> IT WAS A DIGITAL CLOCK
Pr ime
<1) <2> <3>
HAS NUMBERS 3.35 1 .45 2.75
HAS HANDS 3.85 4.25 3.30
HAS TIME 1 .75 1.90 1 .10
HAS AN ALARM 2.60 3.35 4.10
TICKS 3.45 4.05 3.75
F(4,57) = 48, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.11
Mean Salience Ratincis from Experiment 2: MUD
<1> THE MUD-PACK MADE HER SHIVER
<2> THE MUD WAS DARK
<3> THE MUD OOZED THROUGH HER TOES
Pr ime
(1) <2) <3>
IS SQUISHY 2.65 1 .40 3.90
IS COLD 1 .90 3.75 4.00
IS BLACK 4.30 4.00 1.40
IS DIRTY 3.40 3.35 2.35
IS WET 2.75 2.50 3.35
F<4,57) = 16, p. < .001 .
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Table 2.12
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2; ELEPHANT
<1> THE ELEPHANT FILLED THE ROOM
(2) ELEPHANTS ARE DRAB LOOKING
(3) THE ELEPHANT SQUIRTED UATER
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
HAS A TRUNK 2.80 1 .30 3.20
IS BIG 1 .15 2.40 2.45
IS GREY 4.35 3.95 1 .65
HAS TUSKS 3.85 3.80 4.40
HAS LARGE EARS 2.85 3.55 3.30
F<4,57) = 39, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.13
Mean Salience Ratincis -from Experiment 2; SKY
<1> THE SKY WAS OVERCAST
<2> THE SKY STRETCHES BEYOND THE HORIZON
<3> THE SKY WAS CLEAR
Pr ime
<1> <2) (3)
IS ENDLESS 3.85 2.60 1 .30
HAS CLOUDS 1 .75 3.80 4.00
IS BLUE 3.35 2.45 3.10
IS ABOVE US 1 .95 2.75 2.15
HAS STARS 4.10 3.40 4.45
F(4,57) = 16, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.14
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: BUTTERFLIES
<1> BUTTERFLIES REMIND HIM OF FLOWERS
(2) BUTTERFLIES WERE ONCE CATERPILLARS
<3> THE BUTTERFLIES MOVED FROM FLOWER TO FLOWER
Pr ime
(1) <2> <3>
FLUTTERS 3.40 1 .70 3.90
IS COLORFUL 1 .55 3.40 3.45
IS AN INSECT 4.00 2.85 1.45
IS DELICATE 2.50 3.30 3.10
IS SMALL 3.55 3.75 3.10
F<4,57) = 79, £ < .001
.
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Table 2.15
Mean Salience Ratinqs from Experiment 2; ARMY
<1> THE ARMY IS TRAINED FOR WARFARE
<2> THE ARMY IS WELL TRAINED
<3> EVERYONE IN THE ARMY DRESSES ALIKE
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
PROTECTS 2.15 3.55 2.10
IS STRICT 3.60 2.45 2.50
HAS UNIFORMS 4.35 1.25 4.55
FIGHTS 1 .95 4.30 2.85
HAS WEAPONS 2.95 3.45 3.00
F<4,57) = 13, £ < .001
.
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Table 2.16
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: DIME
<1) HE RECEIVED A DIME AS CHANGE
<2> HE PUT THE DIMES INTO A ROLL
(3) THE DIME UAS METAL
IS MONEY
IS ROUND
IS SILVER
IS THIN
IS SMALL
Pr ime
<1> <2> (3)
1 .30 2.35 3.00
3.65 3.60 1 .65
3.00 1 .30 4.25
3.80 3.75 3.00
3.25 3.85 3.10
F(4,57) = 28, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.17
Mean Salience Ratings -from Experiment 2: PUMPKINS
<1> THEY ROLLED PUMPKINS DOWN THE HILL
<2> THEY PLANTED PUMPKINS
<3> THE PUMPKINS ARE BRIGHT
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
IS ROUND 1 .20 2.20 3.70
HAS SEEDS 3.80 3.80 1 .60
IS ORANGE 2.40 1 .10 3.05
HAS A STEM 3.45 3.65 3.00
IS EDIBLE 4.15 4.25 3.65
F<4,57> = 26, p_ < .001 .
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Table 2.18
Mean Salience Ratings from Experiment 2: CHIMNEY
<1) THE CHIMNEY HADN'T BEEN CLEANED IN A LONG TIME
<2> THE CHIMNEY UAS RED
<3> THE CHIMNEY'S FLUE UAS OPEN
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
IS SOOTY 1 .60 2.65 4.00
HAS SMOKE 2.15 1 .60 3.30
HAS BRICKS 3.30 3.40 1.05
IS TALL 3.55 3.65 3.25
IS SQUARE 4.40 3.70 3.40
F<4,57> = 11
, p_ < .001
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Table 3
Examples o-f Prime-Cue Combinations -from Experiment 3
<i) primed attribute matched with cued attribute
ELEPHANT
THE ELEPHANT FILLED THE ROOM
ARE ELEPHANTS BIG?
(ii) primed attribute not matched with cued attribute
ELEPHANT
THE ELEPHANT SQUIRTED WATER
ARE ELEPHANTS GREY?
ELEPHANT
ELEPHANTS ARE DRAB LOOKING
DO ELEPHANTS HAVE TRUNKS?
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Table 4.1
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: DOOR
Pr imes
(1) THE DOOR WAS LATCHED
(2) THE DOOR IS VARNISHED
<3> THE DOOR HAS HINGES
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
KNOB 1.84 (2.25) 1.95 (3.00) 2.10 (3.35)
UOODEN 1.78 < 4. 10) 1.90 (3.85) 1.65 (1.55)
OPENS 2.19 (2.05) 1.50 (1.65) 1.16 (3.60)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.2
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3; POTATOES
Pr imes
(1) THE POTATOES WERE SCRUBBED
(2) THE POTATOES WERE PLANTED
<3> THE POTATOES TASTED GOOD
Pr ime
(1) (2) (3)
Cue
GROUND 2.55 < 2. 30) 2.32 (3.35) 1.73 (1.15)
PEEL 1.65 (2.55) 2.06 (2.85) 1.92 (3.30)
EDIBLE 1.61 (2.25) 1.50 (1.35) 1.96 (2.75)
Note . Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
80
Table 4.3
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 2: OCEAN
Pr imes
<1) IT TAKES A LONGS TIME TO CROSS THE OCEAN
(2) THE OCEAN REFLECTS THE SKY
<3> THE OCEAN IS VIRTUALLY BOTTOMLESS
Pr ime
(1) <2) <3)
Cue
LARGE 2.13 <1.30) 2.02 <2.30) 1.72 (2.20)
BLUE 1.83 < 3. 85) 1.56 (3.30) 2.0? < 1.55)
DEEP 1.5? < 2. 00) 1.98 < 1.20) 1.80 (2.75)
Note . I terns in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.4
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: BOOK
Pr imes
<1) SHE FLIPPED THROUGH THE BOOK
<2) THE BOOK WAS BOUND
(3) THE BOOK CAN BE READ
Pr ime
(1) <2) <3>
Cue
WORDS 2.13 < 2.75) 1.66 < 1.25) 1.74 < 4. 55)
COVERS 1.88 (3.70) 2.02 <4.30> 1.72 <2.85)
PAGES 1.75 (1.80) 1.86 (3.45) 1.99 (3.00)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.5
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: EGGS
Pr imes
(1) HE LIKES HIS EGGS RUNNY
(2) THE SCRAMBLED EGGS WERE CRUNCHY
(3) THEY ROLLED THE EGGS
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
SHELL 2.15 <3. 65) 1.97 (1.95) 1.63 (1.45)
OVAL 1.98 (4.40) 1.78 (1.30) 2.26 (3.85)
YOLK 1.52 <1.95) 1.94 < 3. 90) 1.55 (3.05)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.6
Mean Reaction Times from Experiment 3: HANDKERCHIEF
Pr imes
<1> THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS SOFT
(2) CARRY A HANDKERCHIEF WHEN YOU HAVE A COLD
<3> THE HANDKERCHIEF WAS FOLDED
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
Cue
NOSE 2.29 (2.05) 2.32 (3.65) 1.99 (1.15)
SQUARE 2.00 (3.50) 2.08 (2.25) 2.13 (3.40)
CLOTH 1.92 (1.55) 2.59 (2.00) 1.67 (2.05)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.7
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: ICE
Pr imes
<1) HE MADE ICE CUBES
<2> HE DROPPED ICE CUBES INTO HIS LEMONADE
<3> THE ICE DRIPPED
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
MELT 1.73 < 4. 50) 1.58 (1.85) 1.50 (4.20)
UATER 1.77 <1.65) 2.37 (2.45) 2.52 < 2. 30)
COLD 1.62 (2.20) 1.98 (3.20) 1.37 (1.50)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.8
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3; CANDLES
Pr imes
<1) HE LIT THE CANDLES
(2) THE CANDLES DRIPPED
<3> THE CANDLES SHONE IN THE UINDOU
Pr ime
(1) <2> (3)
Cue
BURNT 1.86 < 2. 65) 2.44 < 2. 60) 2.15 (2.05)
LIGHT 1.76 (1.75) 1.68 (1.45) 2.08 (2.85)
UAX 2.21 (3.00) 1.59 (3.40) 1.76 (1.50)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.9
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: PICNIC
Pr imes
<1> IT UAS A PERFECT DAY FOR A PICNIC
(2) HE ATE TOO MUCH AT THE PICNIC
(3) THEY ENJOYED THE PICNIC
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
____
FUN 1.42 (2.10) 2.00 (2.60) 1.40 <2.80)
OUTDOOR 2.11 (1.75) 2.14 (1.80) 1.65 (2.50)
FOOD 1.88 (2.35) 1.59 (1.80) 2.08 (1.35)
Note . I terns in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.10
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3; MUD
Pr imes
<1> THE MUD-PACK MADE HER SHIVER
<2) THE MUD WAS DARK
<3) THE MUD OOZED THROUGH HER TOES
Pr ime
<1> <2) (3)
Cue
SQUISHY 1.69 (2.45) 1.85 (1.40) 1.5? (3.90)
COLD 3.0? (1.90) 1.76 (3.75) 1.94 (4.00)
BLACK 1.97 (4.30) 1.52 < 4. 00) 1.94 < 1.40)
Note . I terns in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.11
Mean Reaction Times from Experiment 3: ELEPHANT
Pr imes
(1) THE ELEPHANT FILLED THE ROOM
(2) ELEPHANTS ARE DRAB LOOKING
<3> THE ELEPHANT SQUIRTED WATER
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
TRUNK 1.64 (2.80) 2.31 (1.30) 1.80 (3.20)
BIG 2.09 (1.15) 1.72 (2.40) 1.39 (2.45)
GREY 1.70 (4.35) 1.52 (3.95) 2.04 (1.65)
Note . Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.12
Mean Reaction Times front Experiment 3; BUTTERFLIES
Pr imes
<1> BUTTERFLIES REMIND HIM OF FLOWERS
(2) BUTTERFLIES WERE ONCE CATERPILLARS
(3) THE BUTTERFLIES MOVED FROM FLOWER TO FLOWER
Pr ime
<1> (2) (3)
Cue
m ^^^
FLUTTERS 1.94 <3.40) 2.39 (1.70) 1.72 (3.90)
COLORFUL 2.48 < 1.55) 1.71 (3.40) 1.68 (3.45)
INSECT 2.22 < 4. 00) 2.14 (2.85) 2.38 (1.45)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.13
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3; DIME
Pr imes
<1) HE RECEIVED A DIME AS CHANGE
(2) HE PUT THE DIMES INTO A ROLL
(3) THE DIME WAS METAL
Pr ime
(1) (2) (3)
Cue
MONEY 1.58 < 1.30) 1.55 (2.35) 1.86 (3.00)
ROUND 1.6? (3.65) l.?5 (3.60) 1.35 (1.65)
SILVER 2.28 (3.00) 1.87 (1.30) 1.71 (4.25)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
91
Table 4.14
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3; PUMPKINS
Pr imes
<1> THEY ROLLED PUMPKINS DOWN THE HILL
(2) THEY PLANTED PUMPKINS
(3) THE PUMPKINS ARE BRIGHT
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3>
Cue
ROUND 1.85 (1.20) 1.67 (2.20) 1.78 (3.70)
SEEDS 1.57 < 3. 80) 2.04 (3.80) 1.64 (1.60)
ORANGE 1.93 (2.40) 1.63 (1.10) 1.52 (3.05)
Note
. Items in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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Table 4.15
Mean Reaction Times -from Experiment 3: CHIMNEY
Pr imes
<1) THE CHIMNEY HADN'T BEEN CLEANED IN A LONG TIME
(2) THE CHIMNEY WAS RED
<3> THE CHIMNEY'S FLUE UAS OPEN
Pr ime
<1> (2) <3)
Cue
SOOTY 2.24 (1.60) 2.53 (2.65) 1.77 <4.00)
SMOKE 1.93 (2.15) 2.00 (1.60) 2.45 (3.30)
BRICKS 2.59 (3.30) 1.63 (3.40) 1.99 (1.05)
Note
. I terns in parentheses are the corresponding
salience ratings -from Experiment 2, -for each respective
prime/cue pairing.
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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, psychological studies of semantics
have contained the tacit understanding that,
-for any
given item, meaning is -Fixed, and that components which
comprise that meaning are discrete. The present study
examines meaning using a system o-f continuous semantic
features, which allows weighting o-f an item's semantic
componenets relative to its use, as determined by
context. The study demonstrates that the salience o-f
an item's attributes varies as a -function o-f context,
and implies that a similar process is occurring at the
underlying level o-f semantic features, i.e., that a
feature which in one context is vital to an item's
meaning may be -far less salient in another context. A
variable feature theory making use of continuous
semantic features, existing in a state of flux, is
proposed to describe this process.
